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The pessimistic induction (PI) from the history of science, in its most basic form, is the following enumerative induction: since most past scientific theories are not even approximately true—even the ones empirically successful in their time—most scientific theories, including present and future ones, are probably not approximately true either.  There is, of course, a massive and sophisticated literature on the PI, with objections from realists and corresponding replies from anti-realists defending the PI.  The present paper does not broach any of these familiar debates (e.g. ‘Are past theories sufficiently similar to present ones to serve as a proper inductive base (Hardin and Rosenberg [1982], pp. 610ff.)?’, ‘Does the PI commit the base rate fallacy (Magnus and Callender [2004])?’, or ‘Are the parts of past theories responsible for empirical success approximately true (Kitcher [1993], p.149; Psillos [1999], p.110)?’).  If you already think the PI is fatally flawed for whatever reason, nothing said here should sway that belief.
	My aim here is to pose a different challenge for the PI, and to present and evaluate the PI-proponent’s possible responses.  What is this new challenge?  The PI argues from the untruth of past theories to the probable untruth of present and future theories.  On the usual understanding of the PI, ‘untrue’ is equivalent to ‘false’, so many PI-defenders claim they are arguing that present and future theories are false.​[1]​  However, on current views of the language-world relation that are common (but not universal), large chunks of past theories are neither true nor false.​[2]​   The reason is that certain sentences with non-referring nouns are truth-valueless, and many past theories contain terms that fail to refer, such as ‘Vulcan’, ‘phlogiston’, ‘caloric’, and so on.  In short, if one accepts these common views in semantics, and believes that past scientific theories are shot through with non-referring nouns, then one must accept that past theories are also full of sentences that are neither true nor false.  And since anyone who accepts the PI accepts that past and present scientific theories are relevantly similar, the PI proponent must also accept that present theories probably contain many truth-valueless claims.
	But, one might ask at this point, how does this constitute a ‘challenge’ for PI-supporters?  Why wouldn’t the PI-defender simply grant the point, and say that it doesn’t matter whether ‘Caloric is weightless’ etc. are false or truth-valueless?​[3]​  This PI defender could say that as long as a theory is not approximately true, it should not be accepted, and that is all a scientific anti-realist needs.  The reason this constitutes a challenge for the usual PI defender today is that it makes the conclusion of the PI semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse.​[4]​  And semantic anti-realism is widely rejected by scientific anti-realists today, who largely follow van Fraassen’s lead in subscribing to semantic realism (viz., so-called ‘theoretical’ claims have truth-values) and epistemic anti-realism (viz., those truth-values are either often false or unknown).  Part of van Fraassen’s achievement was showing philosophers of science how one could be a scientific anti-realist, without succumbing to semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse, a position attributed to outmoded logical positivists.  So, if the PI (plus standard views in semantics) commits its proponents to semantic anti-realism, that is a problem for most defenders of the PI today. 
I will proceed as follows.  On prevailing views in the philosophy of language, reference failure generates truth-valueless sentences.  Section 2 covers this claim.  Now, the usual defender of the PI accepts that present theories are relevantly similar to past ones, and that past theories exhibit significant reference failure.   Therefore, the usual defender of the PI has to accept either a kind of semantic anti-realism, or substantive and unorthodox commitments in the philosophy of language.​[5]​  In sections 3 and 4, I examine strategies the PI proponent could use to either lessen the sting of this argument, or learn to live with it.
		
2. Designation Failure
Many philosophers claim that certain sentences whose noun phrases fail to designate (‘denote’, ‘refer’) are neither true nor false.  Before describing the rationales for the various versions of this view, I will provide a brief account of what I mean by ‘designation’.  First, not only do names designate individuals, but also natural kind terms designate natural kinds.  So in this sense of ‘designation’, for example, neither ‘Pegasus’ nor ‘phlogiston’ designate anything.  Second, because successful designation singles out exactly one entity, there are two ways a term can fail to designate: it can under-designate, if it designates no entity, or it can over-designate, when the term picks out more than one entity.  For example (if we take definite descriptions as designators instead of devices of quantification), the hackneyed ‘the present King of France’ and ‘Planet Vulcan’ both under-designate, as does ‘phlogiston’.  On the other hand, ‘the US senator from New York’ over-designates, since each US state has two senators.  Some think of over-designation as a kind of ambiguity: an expression that (given its type) should pick out one entity, actually picks out more than one. 
The most philosophically well-known case of over-designation is perhaps Putnam’s example of ‘jade’, which designates two chemically different substances, jadeite and nephrite ([1975], p. 241).​[6]​  Other examples of over-designation can be found in taxonomy, specifically, in terms for polyphyletic groups, and perhaps also for paraphyletic groups, such as prokaryotes.​[7]​  The term ‘prokaryote’ was introduced as a natural kind term​[8]​ applying to any organism that is not a eukaryote (a eukaryote is any organism whose genetic material is encased in a nucleus).  However, there are actually two distinct taxa whose genetic material is not nucleated: eubacteria and archaebacteria (or ‘bacteria’ and ‘archaea’).  One might suggest that this is not over-designation, on the grounds that ‘prokaryote’ actually designates a more general natural kind encompassing both the eubacteria and archaebacteria.  Now, if the eubacteria and archaebacteria were members of a higher natural kind that excluded the eukaryotes, then ‘prokaryote’ would designate that genus.  However, there is no higher natural kind in this case: eubacteria and archaebacteria are at least as genetically distant from one another as each taxon is from the eukaryotes, so a group composed of them would be similar to a group that included all and only the humans, bonobos, and their last common ancestors, but excluded the chimps—and that group is not a natural kind.  In sum, as ‘designation’ is used here, both singular terms and natural kind terms can designate, and designation failure includes both under-designation and over-designation. 

2.1. Designation failure leads to truth-valueless sentences
I stated above that many philosophers hold that sentences containing non-designating terms are neither true nor false.  Before detailing the general theoretical principles that underwrite this view, let us consider an intuition that motivates it.  Consider the following sentence, which contains a non-denoting name: ‘Vulcan orbits the Sun once every 473 hours’.   With our current scientific knowledge, we today would certainly say that this sentence, which LeVerrier believed, is incorrect.  But now consider the negation of this sentence: ‘Vulcan does not orbit the Sun once every 473 hours’.  This sentence suggests that Vulcan’s orbit is actually either faster or slower than 473 hours.  But that is incorrect too.   At first glance, one might be tempted to say that both these sentences are false—after all, they are both untrue declarative sentences.  However, the only way a sentence and its negation can both be false is if the original, un-negated sentence is both true and false.  In short, if both these sentences are false, then a contradiction follows; thus, these two sentences cannot both be false.  A similar analysis could be run on Lavoisier’s claim that ‘there are no vessels through which it [caloric] cannot escape’ ([1789/1790], p.6): it is untrue by modern lights, but so is its negation (since there are no vessels from which caloric can escape).  But we cannot declare both Lavoisier’s claim and its negation false, on pain of contradiction. 
	Several philosophical luminaries endorse the view that certain sentences with non-designating terms are neither true nor false.  Bertrand Russell takes the view that a sentence with a term that designates nothing is ‘nonsense, because you cannot have a constituent of a proposition which is nothing at all’ ([1986], pp. 207-8).  David Braun ([1993]) calls this the ‘no-proposition view’: sentences with non-designating names and natural kind terms do not express propositions.​[9]​  Kripke also endorses the no-proposition view ([2011], pp. 67-8), as does Keith Donnellan ([1974]).  However, one need not go as far as the no-proposition view, even though the position enjoys such distinguished defenders.  Many philosophers instead hold a ‘partial-propsition’ view: a sentence with a non-designating term expresses an incomplete proposition, and incomplete propositions still lack a truth-value.  On the partial-proposition view, sentences with non-designating terms are not utter nonsense, for they have some meaningful components that are combined grammatically, but those meaningful components nonetheless fail to generate something truth-valued upon combination.  
The no- and partial-proposition views are, as the next subsection argues, natural corollaries of direct reference theory (DRT).  DRT’s leading competitor​[10]​ is the Fregean view, which holds that a sentence with a non-designating term does express a complete sense.  Nonetheless, Fregeans also hold that such a sentence lacks a truth-value, on the grounds that one of its components lacks a referent.  Despite their differences, the Fregean, no-proposition, and partial-proposition views all prima facie declare certain sentences with non-designating terms to be neither true nor false.  Let us consider them in turn.
2.1.1. Direct Reference Theory
Direct reference theory can be summarized as follows:
(DRT: names) The semantic content of a name, if any, is the individual, if any, to which the name refers.
(DRT: kind terms) The semantic content of a kind term, if any, is the property or kind, if any, to which the kind term refers.
(DRT: sentences)  The semantic content, if any, of a sentence containing a name (resp. natural kind term) includes the individual (resp. natural kind), if any, to which that name (resp. natural kind term) refers.
In particular, DRT contrasts with descriptivism, the view that the semantic content of a name or natural kind term is synonymous with a description.  
	Everyone would agree that the non-sentential phrase ‘____ is large’ is neither true nor false.    But if empty names have no semantic content, as DRT would have it, then the semantic content of (atomic)​[11]​ sentences containing empty names will be just as truth-valueless as the semantic content of the non-sentential phrase above: both are missing semantic inputs necessary to generate a truth-valued content.  Let us ground this intuitive idea within a broader theoretical framework.  For example, if we take the Russellian picture of propositions as structured set-theoretic entities, the sentence ‘Vulcan is smaller than Mercury’ expresses the following ordered triple with a missing component:
	<_____ , Mercury, Smaller> 
where the last entry is the relational property of being smaller than.  ‘Vulcan is smaller than Mercury’ has the grammatical structure of a sentence, and it contains some uncontroversially meaningful terms, but the above set-theoretic construction is incomplete in a respect relevant to its truth-value (regardless of whether we consider it a partial proposition or no proposition at all).  DRT proponents Adams and Stecker ([1994]) argue that the non-referring term will play a semantic role similar (if not identical) to that of a variable,​[12]​ and everyone agrees open formulae like x is tall or John is X lack truth-values (if no values are assigned to those variables).  The view that partial propositions in particular do not have truth-values is also elaborated and defended in (Taylor [2000]), (Reimer [2001]), and (Everett [2003]). 
2.1.2.  Fregeanism
Fregean semantics is often considered the chief philosophical rival to DRT (but see footnote 10). And although there are important differences between DRT and Fregeanism, both agree that atomic sentences containing non-referring names are truth-valueless.  On Frege’s picture, while such sentences express a complete sense​[13]​ (since empty names have senses), they lack a referent—and of course, Frege holds that the referent [Bedeutung] of a sentence is its truth-value.  He writes:  
The sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense.  But since it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’, occurring therein, has a Bedeutung, it is also doubtful whether the whole sentence does. … Whoever does not admit the name has a Bedeutung can neither apply nor withhold the predicate. ([1892/1997], p. 157)
Despite the disagreements between DRT theorists and Fregeans, both sides concur that sentences with non-referring names are truth-valueless (at least, without adding modifications to the two views: see §2.3).
	Returning to the main thread of the discussion: one standard commitment of PI-proponents is that past theories are shot through with terms that fail to designate.  Thus, if the PI-proponent accepts either DRT or Fregeanism (two leading semantic theories of truth and reference), then she is prima facie also committed to interpreting portions of past theories containing those terms as truth-valueless—in short, she is committed to semantic anti-realism about past scientific discourse.  And if she accepts the PI, which requires present theories to be relevantly similar to past ones, then she is also a semantic anti-realist about present scientific theories as well.
2.1.3. Accounts of reference-fixing: why ‘phlogiston’ fails to designate
I will not present a full defense of the claim that past theories are full of non-designating theoretical terms, because PI-based anti-realists are usually taken to be committed to this claim,​[14]​ and this paper only argues for a conditional thesis: if you are a PI-proponent, then you must accept either semantic anti-realism or (other) unorthodox semantic views.  Given that I am only attempting to establish this conditional, it is dialectically unnecessary for me to defend fully the claim that past theories are shot through with non-designating terms.  However, I will briefly rehearse rationales for believing theoretical kind terms like ‘phlogiston’ fail to designate.
In virtue of what do names and natural kind terms acquire the referents they in fact have?  The basic options are probably very familiar to most readers: (i) via ostension of samples (and perhaps foils), familiar from Kripke, Putnam, and their followers; (ii) via a reference-fixing description, possibly along the lines of (Lewis [1970]); or (iii) via some hybrid of the two (Stanford and Kitcher [2000]).  The following précis only explicitly discusses natural kind terms and not names, both in the interests of brevity, and because natural kind terms are both more complex and more common in scientific theories.
On the ostension-of-samples view, to determine what kind is picked out by a newly-introduced natural kind term t, we take samples of the stuff that t purportedly refers to in the actual world, and say that t designates whatever kind those samples (almost) all instantiate.  As Kripke puts it: ‘terms for natural kinds… get their reference fixed in this way; the substance is defined as the kind instantiated by (almost all of) a given sample’ ([1972], p. 136).  Later uses of t inherit this semantic content from the dubbing or baptism, if they are appropriately causally connected to the original baptism.  We can make this process of semantic determination more sophisticated (and eliminate or at least limit the damage of the qua-problem (Sterelny [1983])) by also introducing to the dubbing a set of foils, which are supposedly not to be instances of that kind. 
The designation of ‘water’ can also be fixed via a description, such as ‘the odorless, colorless stuff that composes our oceans, rivers, glaciers, and clouds.’  Kripke and Putnam allow for this possibility, for this is not descriptivism about names and natural kind terms.  This description of water, on the Kripke-Putnam view, is not synonymous with ‘water’, but it does successfully assign a designation to ‘water’.  How can we extrapolate from this example of ‘water’ to a general notion of a reference-fixing description?  Here, David Lewis’s appropriation of ‘Ramsification’ is widely-discussed (Lewis [1970]; Kroon and Nola [2001]).  Suppose we have a theory T, and that some of the non-logical vocabulary of T is antecedently unproblematic (e.g. the referents of these expressions are given); let this vocabulary be o1, o2, … on.  Suppose further that some of T’s vocabulary is theoretical vocabulary (t1, t2, … tm), and we wish to determine what each of the ti’s designate.  Lewis’s idea, inspired by Ramsey, is to form the conjunction of all the sentences of T, represented by T(t1, t2, … tm; o1, o2, … on), and then replace each of the ti with variables of the appropriate type, to generate T* = T(x1, x2, … xm; o1, o2, … on) (the xi’s here are not restricted to first-order variables).  If there is a unique sequence a1, a2, … am that satisfies T*, then tk refers to ak (for each k).  In his original 1970 presentation, Lewis said that if there is no such sequence, or more than one, then tk fails to refer.  Later, Lewis refined the picture, so that reference failure was more rare.  If more than one sequence satisfies T*, then tk refers indeterminately (in our terms, ti ‘over-designates’) to every satisfying ak (Lewis [1994]), unless the various ak’s differ widely from one another, in which case tk refers to nothing (Lewis [1997]). Lewis also said that if there are no satisfying sequences, but a unique sequence is close to satisfying T*, then tk refers to the k-th member of that sequence (‘close’ here could be cashed out e.g. in terms of uniquely satisfying most of the sentences comprising the large conjunction T*).  In applying Lewis’s strategy to scientific realism, Papineau ([1996]) suggests ‘Ramsifying’ only the core, fundamental parts of T instead of the entire theory; Psillos advocates a similar view ([1999], Ch. 12)—though the issue of which parts belong to the core is thorny, and the core/ non-core boundary may be indeterminate.
Finally, there are the hybrid views of how theoretical terms acquire their reference.  On one recent hybrid theory of reference-fixing for theoretical terms (Stanford and Kitcher [2000], p. 114), samples, foils, and a description are all deployed to fix the reference of a theoretical term.  On such theories, the semantic content of ‘water’ is still H2O, instead of a descriptive property.  That is, ‘water’ is not synonymous with the description ‘the odorless, colorless stuff that composes our oceans, rivers, glaciers, and clouds’.
	Now that we have three theories of reference-fixing on the table, we can ask: what verdict do each of these three theories of reference-fixing give concerning ‘phlogiston’ and other prima facie cases of designation failure?  Suppose we collect—or ask Joseph Priestley to collect—several samples of stuff that Priestley calls ‘phlogiston’, or at least materials he considers phlogiston-rich.  He will presumably provide some gas attained by setting a lit candle or a live mouse inside a sealed container.  Priestley would also collect highly flammable materials that leave little by-product after combustion, such as charcoal.  We could also ask Priestley to collect some foils, which would include dephlogisticated air (what we call ‘oxygen’), and any other type of material that is difficult or impossible to burn.  Also, we could ask Priestley for a reference-fixing description, either instead of the samples and foils, or in addition to them, such as: ‘the stuff contained in bodies that is emitted in combustion, and which prevents combustion and respiration when it saturates the air.’  Or (more realistically, since we cannot communicate with Priestley’s ghost) we could extract Priestley’s phlogiston theory (or just its fundamental core) from his texts, and create a T* by (roughly speaking) replacing ‘phlogiston’ throughout with a variable.  Now we ask: what kind is instantiated by all the samples, but none of the foils, and/ or is picked out by Priestley’s own reference-fixing description, and/or is the unique kind satisfying T*?  The answer to all three appears to be: no kind at all.​[15]​  Since there is no such thing as phlogiston, there is no essential property or inner constitution shared among the samples, absent from the foils.  Furthermore, there is no kind to pick out by a sufficiently detailed description, or to satisfy a Ramsified open sentence of the (core) theory.  Therefore, ‘phlogiston’ picks out no natural kind, on any of the three leading accounts of reference-fixing.​[16]​  
The usual pessimistic inductor maintains that ‘phlogiston’ is typical of the historical record.  Past scientific theories consigned to the historical scrap heap are full of non-designating theoretical terms: ‘caloric’, ‘absolute velocity’, ‘lumeniferous ether’, ‘entelechy’, etc. all fit the bill.  In fact, if we look at the list of scientific theories that were empirically successful but ultimately wrong from Laudan’s seminal article on the PI, we find that he explicitly selects theories whose central terms prima facie fail to designate (Laudan [1981], p. 33).  Now, your linguistic intuitions may lean towards calling sentences with non-denoting terms false; the next subsection provides reasons for considering them truth-valueless instead. 
	Before investigating arguments that such sentences are truth-valueless instead of false, it should be noted that certain philosophers argue that at least some of these discarded terms do refer: for example, some claim that ‘ether’ refers to the electromagnetic field (Hardin and Rosenberg [1982], p. 611; Psillos [1999], p. 287).  Many defend the intuition that they don’t (Kroon [1985]; Nola [1980]); I take no official position on this dispute here.  I only claim that a PI-based anti-realist cannot use these arguments, because they are based on realist premises that the PI-proponent cannot accept, on pain of abandoning anti-realism.  There are three plausible reasons why the PI-based anti-realist cannot appeal to these arguments.  First, some hold that the denial of  ‘Theoretical terms typically refer’ is a non-negotiable commitment of PI-based anti-realism.  However, this may not be decisive.  We can imagine a heterodox anti-realist who believes the premise of the PI, viz. that the large majority of our past predictively successful scientific theories are not even approximately true, but also believes that the theoretical terms in those past theories’ terms typically refer.​[17]​  If this heterodox anti-realist’s two beliefs were true, then the conclusion of the PI could be that present theories are probably false, instead of truth-valueless. 
	However, the strategies available for assigning referents to discarded theoretical terms are not available to PI-based anti-realists, because adopting these strategies undercuts the view that past theories are not even approximately true—a sine qua non of the PI-proponent. The imagined heterodox anti-realist purports to believe past theories are false, but their theoretical terms typically refer.  However, ‘Term “t” refers’ is standardly taken to entail ‘t exists’—and it is a characteristic position of anti-realists to not believe that theoretical entities (the referents of theoretical terms) exist.  We cannot prize apart the rejection of ‘Typically, theoretical terms refer’ from the endorsement of ‘Typically, our past fundamental scientific theories are not approximately true’—for successful reference brings important theoretical truths in its wake.
	Now, third, imagine that the heterodox anti-realist somehow either devises a successful response to this objection, or she shows how an anti-realist can tolerate this consequence (e.g., ‘ether’ refers to the electromagnetic field, but most of what the ether theory says about it is massively false.)  Even then, the heterodox anti-realist would still be in trouble: on extant strategies for assigning a referent to e.g. ‘ether’, such an anti-realism is untenable.  Such strategies involve something along the lines of the Ramsey-Lewis theory of reference-fixing presented above.​[18]​  We take the past (core) theory involving the theoretical term t, and then attempt to find something (that we now believe exists) which, if we interpret t as referring to that entity, will make (almost) all of the past (core) theory approximately true.  But notice what has happened: when you assign referents to every theoretical term in such a way that you make almost all of the (core) theoretical claims involving these terms approximately true, then you can no longer believe the premise of the PI, viz. that our past fundamental scientific theories are typically not approximately true.  An anti-realist who assigned referents in this way would be analogous to my interpreting someone I am convinced is a liar according to the charitable maxim ‘maximize the speaker’s approximately true utterances’.  If my charity is sufficiently radical, I could probably re-interpret nearly everything this person says as approximately true—but then I could no longer consider this person a liar.  Thus, unless the heterodox anti-realist can devise a new strategy for assigning referents to discarded theoretical terms, she cannot both justify her claim that discarded theoretical terms typically refer, and simultaneously believe past theories are typically not approximately true.​[19]​
In short, regardless of whether realists can successfully defend their strategies for assigning referents to discarded terms, the PI-based anti-realist cannot use these strategies to show that (almost)​[20]​ all of the discarded theoretical terms successfully refer—at least if she wishes to remain committed to the PI.  And if one accepts that (most of) ‘phlogiston’ and the rest are non-designating, then on the most straightforward understanding of DRT and Fregeanism—widely held semantic views—one must accept that sentences with non-designating nouns lack a truth-value.

2.2. Objection: Sentences exhibiting designation failure are false, not truth-valueless
Note that the immediately preceding sentence says ‘the most straightforward understanding of DRT and Fregeanism’.  Some direct reference theorists attempt to ‘explain away’ their theory’s apparent consequence that certain sentences with non-designating names and natural kind terms are truth-valueless.  David Braun, a proponent of DRT, has argued that atomic​[21]​ partial propositions are (assuming no other semantic anomalies) usually false ([1993], [2005]).  But this move is not restricted to proponents of DRT: the question of whether atomic sentences containing non-referring noun phrases are false or truth-valueless can be raised even if one does not subscribe to DRT.  For instance, Tyler Burge ([1974]) has argued in favor of negative free logic, in which all atomic sentences containing empty names are considered false.​[22]​  Mark Sainsbury, a self-identified Fregean, has argued for the same conclusion ([2005]).  This is an important and serious objection: if Braun, Burge, and Sainsbury are correct, then a PI-proponent would conclude that the fundamental claims of our present scientific theories are likely false, not truth-valueless—thereby avoiding semantic anti-realism.
	How could a defender of DRT or Fregeanism hold that atomic sentences containing non-referring names are false?  I shall present three of the most popular arguments,​[23]​ and argue that none are compelling.  The first appeals to intuition.  Some people may simply have the intuition that ‘Vulcan is smaller than Mercury’ is false.  However, this intuition is far from universal, and many people have the incompatible intuition that such propositions are neither true nor false.  Further, this intuition of falsity may well be the result of informants’ conflating falsity with untruth.
	But the proponent of the view that partial propositions are false usually holds that there is more support for her position than mere intuition.  Braun ([2005], p. 606) gives a second reason.  He grants that many things in the world cannot be true or false, such as people, rocks, and the number 5.  But propositions are the kinds of things that can be true or false.  And any proposition that is untrue is false.  Thus, since partial propositions are both (i) not true and (ii) propositions, they must be false.  However, one can respond that it is not obvious that partial propositions are genuine propositions (in the sense needed for the argument to be sound, viz., they must be true or false); Adams and Stecker hold that it is ‘a sound maxim that only complete thoughts (propositions) express truths or falsehoods’ ([1994], p. 398; my emphasis).  We appear to be at an impasse of competing intuitions between Braun on the one hand and Adams and Stecker on the other. One might worry that this disagreement is rationally irresoluble.  There is often unclarity and/ or vagueness concerning when a partial F can be treated as a (genuine) F: for example, exactly how much of the material of my house would have to be removed before it was no longer a genuine house?  However, in the particular case of propositions, unlike the case of houses, I believe we are not forced to give up finding a resultion.  Why?  Propositions are often thought of as corresponding in important respects to sentences.  And a partial sentence, no matter how complex or otherwise ‘close’ it is to being a (complete) sentence, is not a sentence, on grammatical grounds.  So, if the analogy between sentences and propositions is sufficiently strong, then partial propositions are not propositions simpliciter, and Braun’s argument above is unsound.
	A third reason given for assigning atomic partial propositions the value false involves existential claims involving non-referring noun phrases (Caplan [2002]).  Even if one grants that it is not intuitively obvious whether a sentence like ‘Vulcan is smaller than Mercury’ is false or truth-valueless, nonetheless ‘Vulcan exists’ seems straightforwardly false.  This appears to be an example of an atomic​[24]​ sentence expressing a partial proposition that has a truth-value.  Then, if all atomic sentences expressing partial propositions should have the same truth-value (following the maxim that similar cases should receive similar treatment, to avoid ad hoc maneuvers), then all such sentences should be false, not truth-valueless.  
	There are two broad types of response to this objection: accommodate the intuition that ‘Vulcan exists’ is false, or bite the bullet and say ‘Vulcan exists’ really is truth-valueless, and attempt to explain away the felt falsity.  To pursue the first, the proponent of DRT could adopt a positive or neutral formal semantics for free logics, since such semantics are specifically designed to make ‘Vulcan exists’ come out false (Lambert [2001]).  One might object that this would contravene the maxim just mentioned that all atomic sentences expressing partial propositions should have the same truth-value.  However, there is independent evidence against that maxim.  For example, many people have the intuition that the atomic sentences ‘Vulcan = Vulcan’ and ‘Vulcan is the same size as Vulcan’ are true (Caplan [2002]).  So some atomic sentences with empty names are felt to be true, and others false, so a uniform treatment will have to violate some intuition.  Finally, it appears from these cases that the truth-valued atomic sentences with empty names involve the concept of identity, either simpliciter or identity in some respect (e.g., in size).  For the standard first-order logic regimentation of ‘Vulcan exists’ is of course ‘x(x = Vulcan)’.  This gives us an answer to the charge that making an exception for the falsity of ‘Vulcan exists’ is ad hoc: sentences with empty names involving identity are the only ones that have truth-values, and making a principled exception for identity-statements allows us to accommodate both ‘Vulcan = Vulcan’ and ‘Vulcan exists’.
	A second type of response to the objection from existential sentences is to bite the bullet: accept that ‘Vulcan exists’ in fact has no truth-value (Adams and Stecker [1994]; Adams and Dietrich [2004]).  But how can this position account for the intuition that ‘Vulcan exists’ feels false? The answer is that ‘Vulcan’ is associated with certain descriptions in an ordinary speaker’s mind, which are conversationally implicated in sentences involving ‘Vulcan’: ‘empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths.  Names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmatically imparted truths when empty names are used’ (Adams and Dietrich [2004], p. 125).​[25]​  That is, though a sentence like ‘Santa Claus exists’ is strictly speaking truth-valueless (since it is ‘missing’ a needed semantic input), it nonetheless pragmatically implicates the falsehood that there is a man who permanently resides at the North Pole and brings toys to children every Christmas eve, and that is why ‘Santa exists’ feels false.
	Thus far, I have argued that none of the three reasons put forward in favor of taking partial propositions as false instead of truth-valueless are compelling.  Furthermore, there are also at least three positive reasons to reject the view.​[26]​  First, there is analogy between propositions and grammatical sentences mentioned earlier: if this analogy is apposite, then incomplete propositions are not propositions, and thus not truth-apt entities.  Second, as all parties to the debate acknowledge, in languages with identity, sentences like ‘Santa = Santa’ come out false (and ‘Santa  Santa’ true) on the Burge-Braun-Sainsbury proposal.  This appears counterintuitive.  However, it is not clear how much weight this fact should carry; it does contravene a fairly basic logical law, but such a modification may be tolerable, given the difficulties that empty terms create for any semantic proposal.  More germane for present purposes is that ‘Vulcan is not smaller than Mercury’ etc. will all be classed as true (since the un-negated base sentences would be false), which also seems counterintuitive.
	There is a third reason to reject the view that I believe is stronger (also urged by Nolt ([2010], §4.1)).  ‘Vulcan is bigger than Mars’, ‘Vulcan is smaller than Mars’, and ‘Vulcan is the same size as Mars’ are all false on negative free logic, and each of their negations will be true.  But ‘a is larger than b’ has the same meaning as ‘a is not smaller than b and a is not the same size as b’.  Now we have a contradiction, and to escape it we need to give up either the usual definition of ‘larger than’ or the Braun et al. view that such sentences are false.  I opt for the latter.  One way to save Braun’s view is to say that one of the interdefinable predicates is really basic, and the other ones really derived.  But that response seems desperate: e.g. given any two of ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, and ‘same size’, the third is definable (assuming our language contains a sign for negation)—but which of the two are truly basic, and which is the derived concept?  This question strikes me as hopeless.  So the view that all atomic sentences with non-referring terms are false looks untenable. 
	I do not think these three pieces of evidence conclusively refute the view that atomic sentences with empty names are false on DRT or Fregeanism.  However, I hope that I have shown that the supposed evidence in the view’s favor is weak at best, and that there is good evidence against it.  Thus, to return to the main thread of the discussion, if one believes designation failure leads to partial propositions, and believes the historical record is replete with terms that fail to designate, then the balance of evidence favors semantic anti-realism about scientific theories.  
	Stepping back, one further argument against past theories being truth-valueless instead of false should be addressed.  This simple argument is independent of DRT and Fregean commitments.  Everyone today (myself included) agrees that certain parts of past theories are false; in particular, superseded theories’ observational predictions outside the acceptable range of error when checked against experiment are false.  The argument then continues: ‘Since a theory can be thought of as a conjunction of claims, and one kind of claim a theory makes are observational predictions, the whole superseded theory will be false, because a conjunction with at least one false conjunct is false’.  However, this move can be resisted.  First, whether we call the whole theory false or truth-valueless depends on whether we accept (an analogue of) the strong Kleene scheme for three-valued logic or the weak one.​[27]​  Thus, one cannot immediately infer that the whole theory is false, without accepting the strong scheme instead of the weak one.  So anyone who uses this argument to maintain that the whole superseded theory is false must justify using the strong scheme instead of the weak one.  Second, and more importantly, regardless of which Kleene scheme one uses, this argument still allows that some portions of the historical theories at issue in the realism debate make truth-valueless claims.  That is, many individual conjuncts of a theory could still be truth-valueless, and thus, if one accepts the pessimistic induction, many individual conjuncts of our present theories are likely truth-valueless—a conclusion which is still very unwelcome to present-day anti-realists.  Finally, I should stress that my claim is that many of the fundamental or so-called ‘theoretical’ claims of the theories, as opposed to their observational predictions, can be viewed as truth-valueless.  This is significant, because this is where the debate about scientific realism is traditionally located, not in the realm of observable predictions (sensible scientific anti-realists always grant that mature scientific theories make many successful predictions).

2.3. Avoiding truth-valuelessness via controversial semantic positions
The central argument of this paper is that a PI-proponent must accept either semantic anti-realism or other controversial semantic views.  In this subsection, I present four of these ‘controversial semantic views’ that would provide truth-values for the untrue sentences of past theories, thereby avoiding semantic anti-realism.  On each of these four views, terms like ‘phlogiston’ and ‘Vulcan’ have sufficient semantic content to determine a truth-value for an atomic sentence in which they occur.  First, one could be an orthodox descriptivist about names and natural kind terms: contra Kripke and Putnam, the semantic content of a name or natural kind term is synonymous with a description.  Though descriptivism about names and natural kind terms is not absurd, it is out of the philosophical mainstream today,​[28]​ for reasons familiar from Kripke, Putnam, and their successors.  It is of course unavailable to someone who endorses DRT or Fregeanism.  Also, even if one adopts descriptivism about names and natural kind terms, another substantive commitment must be made in order to avoid truth-valuelessness (though it is far less unpopular than descriptivism): one must side with Russell in the Russell-Strawson debate over ‘The present King of France is bald’.​[29]​  Russellians hold this sentence is false, whereas the Strawsonian says it is neither true nor false (see §3.1).  For even if descriptivism is correct that ‘Vulcan’ is really a disguised description (‘the planet between Mercury and the Sun’), Strawsonians (and Fregeans) will still maintain that ‘The planet between Mercury and the Sun is smaller than Mars’ is truth-valueless.  Russellians can say this sentence is false because they consider definite descriptions to be devices of quantification, not devices of reference.  This Russellian view (descriptivism about ordinary names and natural kind terms, plus descriptions as quantifiers instead of singular terms) is today an ‘unorthodox semantic view’.    
	But one need not be a devout descriptivist about names and natural kind terms to reject the view that atomic sentences with non-designating names or natural kind terms are truth-valueless.  One could accept that the Kripke-Putnam, Ramsey-Lewis, or hybrid account of how (apparent) natural kind terms acquire their truth-relevant semantic contents is correct for normal (i.e., non-empty) natural kinds, but hold that there is some ‘fall back’ descriptive semantic content deployed when a kind term fails to designate a kind.  Putnam ([1975], p. 241) hints at such a picture; Korman ([2006]) spells it out in detail.  He claims that ‘phlogiston’ et al. are not genuine natural kind terms, since any term that fails to pick out a natural kind is not a natural kind term.  So, since ‘phlogiston’ et al. are not natural kind terms, they can instead express descriptive properties without falling afoul of the Kripke-Putnam insights.  This view has been criticized by Häggqvist and Wikforss ([2005]) on the grounds, first, that whether a linguistic expression qualifies as a natural kind term (or a name) should not potentially require centuries of scientific experiment, and second, that bringing back descriptivism only to handle a single class of problematic cases looks suspiciously ad hoc.  
	Two more views assign semantic content to empty names and natural kind terms, but reject any form of descriptivism.  Nathan Salmon, a prominent defender of DRT, allows that partial propositions are truth-valueless, but argues that there are far fewer non-referring terms than one might initially think.  He suggests that (e.g.) the astronomer LeVerrier created an abstract object, Vulcan, and that his word ‘Vulcan’ refers to this abstract object ([1998]).  This view guarantees a referent for many apparently non-referring terms, and thereby arguably provides truth-values for sentences like ‘Vulcan orbits the Sun’: most such sentences will be false, since (most people think) abstract objects cannot causally interact with the spatiotemporal realm.  I say Salmon’s proposal only ‘arguably’ provides truth-values because some philosophers hold that predicating physical traits of abstract objects is a category mistake, and that sentences containing category mistakes are truth-valueless (Carnap [1958], p. 84).   Perhaps more importantly, Salmon’s proposal has not won many converts among his fellow direct reference theorists;​[30]​ one immediate and serious problem with it is that all simple existence claims containing non-referring singular terms, such as ‘Vulcan exists’, will come out true—which is highly counterintuitive.
The fourth and final view accepts that there is literally nothing that is common to all the samples of purported phlogiston and missing from the foils, or picked out by a reference-fixing description for ‘phlogiston’.  But the conclusion drawn is not that ‘phlogiston’ expresses no semantic content relevant to truth-value, but rather that it expresses the necessarily uninstantiated property of being identical to nothing (Stoneham [1999], p. 119).​[31]​  If one thinks of a property as (determining) an intension (a function from possible worlds to sets), then the intension of every empty natural kind term assigns the empty set to every possible world.  The first problem with this proposal is that ‘phlogiston’, ‘caloric’, ‘entelechy’ etc. would all, in some sense, have the same semantic meaning, namely being identical to nothing.  Not only does this force us to say that ‘Phlogiston is identical to caloric’ and ‘Necessarily, phlogiston is identical to caloric’ are both true, but it also greatly strains interpretive intuitions about how to understand Priestley’s historical texts.  Second, some people are not comfortable admitting the existence of necessarily uninstantiated properties (perhaps on the grounds that not every predicate expresses a genuine property).  Finally, if one thinks that natural kind terms can only acquire semantic content if their utterers come into causal-historical contact with (instantiations of) the appropriate natural kind, and one also believes that coming into causal contact with nothing is impossible, then no natural kind term can designate nothing, again sinking Stoneham’s proposal.
	Considering the four proposals—the descriptivist (Russell), fall-back-descriptivist (Korman), abstract-object (Salmon), and necessarily-uninstantiated-property (Stoneham) views—together, none appears patently false, but each encounters substantial difficulties.​[32]​  Nonetheless, if one accepts the PI-based anti-realist’s claim that ‘phlogiston’ and the like fail to refer, but wants to resist the conclusion that ‘phlogiston’ and the like generate truth-value gaps, then defending one of these four options is likely the most promising option. 
	Finally, before proceeding, it should be briefly noted that the problem for the PI-defender is perhaps even more severe than this section has suggested.  For reference failure is not the only possible route to truth-valueless claims.  Linguists and philosophers of language have also argued that presupposition failure leads to truth-value gaps (Heim and Kratzer [1998]; Glanzberg [2005]), as do certain instances of vague predicates (Fine [1975]).  Philosophers of science describe past theoreticians as writing or uttering claims with untrue presuppositions (Kitcher [1993], pp. 99, 103).  And many philosophers think that scientific language is full of what Waismann calls ‘open texture’ or vague concepts: Joseph LaPorte has recently argued that even ‘species’, ‘mammal’, and ‘water’ are vague terms ([2004]).  Not every sentence containing a vague term is truth-valueless, but this is a third way, in addition to reference and presupposition failures, in which sentences in the historical record could be neither true nor false.​[33]​

3. What to do? Closing the gaps
As we have seen, one way to accept the PI and avoid the conclusion of semantic anti-realism is to hold that designation failure does not generate truth-valueless sentences.  In this section, I discuss another way to reduce the extent of truth-value gaps in the historical record: supervaluations.  This strategy can restrict the range of truth-valueless sentences, but it is limited in two respects: first, it works for cases of over-designation (like ‘mass’ and ‘prokaryote’) but not under-designation, and second, it does not eliminate all gaps resulting from over-designation.  The basic idea behind suprevaluational semantics is straightforward.  Suppose sentence S contains a term that over-designates n items (and no other over-designating terms).  If S would be true on all n ‘disambiguations’​[34]​ of the over-designating term, then S is (super)true.​[35]​  If all n disambiguations would result in false sentences, then S is (super)false.  If some disambiguations are true, while others are false, then S is neither (super)true nor (super)false.  For example, supposing ‘the present senator from New York’ to be a device of reference instead of a device of quantification: ‘The present senator from New York State is over 4 feet tall’ is supertrue (evaluated in 2012), since both Kirsten Gillebrand and Chuck Schumer are above 4 feet in height, ‘The present senator from New York is over 90 years old’ is superfalse, since both Gillebrand and Schumer are younger than 90, and ‘The present senator from New York is female’ is neither supertrue nor superfalse, since one senator is male and the other is female.  This basic idea was presented in intuitive form in (Field [1973]), and refined and given a model theory in (Frost-Arnold [2008]).  Clearly, this procedure will not close all truth-value gaps in sentences containing over-designating terms, even if we elevate supertruth to the status of genuine truth, since some statements containing over-designating terms will be true on some disambiguations and false on others.  We can see how this recipe will work in scientific cases, using the previously mentioned examples of over-designation, viz. Newtonian ‘mass’ and ‘prokaryote’.  For example, ‘Homo Sapiens is a prokaryote’ will be superfalse, since humans are neither eubacteria nor archaebacteria.  ‘No prokaryotes are over three meters long’ is supertrue, since no eubacteria and no archaebacteria are over three meters long.​[36]​
	The supervaluational strategy thus lessens the force of the argument from the PI to semantic anti-realism, since fewer superceded scientific claims will be truth-valueless.  How many truth-value gaps this strategy eliminates depends in part on how extensive over-designation, as opposed to under-designation, is in the scientific record.  And that in turn depends in part on what happens at an ‘imperfect’ baptism of a theoretical term: if there is not a unique common constituent that all the samples share and all the foils lack, should we think of the newly introduced term as failing to designate anything at all, or rather as over-designating the variety of stuffs in the sample, absent from the foils?  (There is a continuum of cases here, from just two stuffs (e.g. jadeite and nephrite), to a sample containing a myriad of wildly divergent substances (Putnam [1975], p. 241).)  If we see such baptisms as generating over-designating terms instead of under-designating ones, then the supervaluational strategy will be more widely applicable.  However, even if we interpret terms arising from wildly divergent samples as over-designating, that will not close the truth-value gaps very tightly, because ceteris paribus as the baptismal samples become more heterogeneous, the number of claims that all disambiguations agree upon will diminish. 
	Christina McLeish ([2006]) defends the supervaluationist picture for historical scientific terms, with very important modifications.  These modifications, I shall argue, create serious problems for her view.  McLeish claims that, in every genuine case of an over-designating term, on one disambiguation the term refers to nothing.  Why?  If a term t over-designates, then it fails to single out anything uniquely; that is reasonably construed as a failure of reference, and if an expression fails to refer, then it refers to nothing.  She correctly concludes that if we allow a disambiguation in which t refers to nothing, then the supervaluational strategy will close no truth-value gaps for atomic sentences, for there will always be a disambiguation in which the sentence containing t is neither true nor false.  Next, she modifies the rule for supertruth: a sentence is supertrue exactly when it is true on at least one disambiguation (what Varzi ([1995]) calls ‘sub-truth’).  This certainly closes the truth-value gaps, but it has extremely unpalatable consequences (a fact McLeish recognizes).  For example, on her proposal, the logical rule of ‘and’-introduction (A, B; therefore A and B) is invalid: A could be true in the first disambiguation, and B true in the second disambiguation, but there are no disambiguations in which both are true.  Furthermore, on her view, we end up committed to sets of contradictory propositions: ‘Prokaryotes exist’ is true, and so is ‘Prokaryotes do not exist’, since there is a disambiguation in which each is true.  By my lights, this medicine is far worse than the disease: revising ‘and’-introduction and accepting sets of contradictory sentences are far more unpalatable than having truth-value gaps in the higher reaches of theoretical science.  
Furthermore, there is independent reason to resist the reasoning that led McLeish to this massively revisionary proposal, beyond its unpalatable consequences.  We can deny that, among the relativist’s disambiguations of Newton’s term ‘mass’, there is a third disambiguation in which it refers to nothing.  We can nonetheless say that it fails to refer, since it fails to single out one quantity, and perfect reference is unique—but this failure is fully captured by the fact that ‘mass’ denotes relativistic mass and proper mass.  Consider a mathematical analogue: ‘4’ lacks a unique referent, since the squares of both 2 and -2 are 4; but it does not also refer to nothing (or even the empty set) in addition to 2 and -2.  So by denying McLeish’s contention that every over-designating term t has a disambiguation in which t refers to nothing, we can eliminate some truth-value gaps (though not all), without having to accept contradictory sets of sentences or reject the ‘and’-introduction rule.
	There is another strategy in the literature for reducing the extent of truth-value gaps in the historical record, due to Kitcher ([1978], [1993]; Stanford and Kitcher [2000]).  Kitcher’s strategy could be called ‘contextualist’: different tokens of the same word-type have different referents, and the referent of a particular token depends on the circumstances in which it is uttered (where the circumstances include the utterer’s ‘dominant intention’ at the time of utterance).  So for example, ‘dephlogisticated air’ sometimes refers to oxygen, but other times it refers to nothing, depending on what led Priestley to utter a particular token.  Like the supervaluational strategy, the contextualist approach (if successful) decreases the incidence of truth-valuelessness in the historical record without eliminating it entirely.  Now, this contextualist view is subtle and sophisticated, and a proper comparison of it to the other gap-closing strategies on offer would require separate treatment.  However, two observations suffice in the current dialectical situation.  First, more than one commentator on Kitcher’s program has argued that there is frequently no fact of the matter as to what, precisely, a particular token of e.g. ‘dephlogisticated air’ refers to: often there are simply not enough facts in the context of utterance (even when supplemented by our current chemical knowledge) to single out a unique referent (Psillos [1997]; McLeish [2005], [2006]).  Second, and more importantly, Kitcher’s strategy is very much a realist one: for example, Kitcher’s contextualist says that most tokens of e.g. ‘Dephlogisticated air improves respiration and combustion’ are true.  Thus an anti-realist who hoped to save the PI from semantic anti-realism by adopting Kitcher’s gap-closing strategy would have difficulty maintaining her scientific anti-realism, since she is making Priestley’s utterances approximately true (recall the end of 2.1.3).  Thus Kitcher’s contextualism is no bulwark for defending the standard understanding of the PI, in which past theories are not even approximately true.

4. Conclusion
Proponents of the PI accept both that present theories are relevantly similar to past ones, and that past theories’ central theoretical terms often fail to designate.  If these PI-defenders also accept DRT or Fregeanism, then they are prima facie committed to semantic anti-realism.  This commitment is prima facie, not inescapable, because certain philosophers of language have attempted to modify DRT to ‘save’ it from the prima facie consequence of widespread truth-valuelessness.  The DRT theorist’s problem, which philosophers of science might initially consider confined to remote and esoteric debates in philosophy of language, is actually the PI-proponent’s problem too.  
	Another way to react to the argument considered here is to bite the bullet, and show that the type of semantic anti-realism at issue here is not absurd or disastrous.  Many criticisms have been leveled at semantic anti-realism, and I shall not review them all here.  But one prominent criticism of semantic anti-realism is that it leads to the absurd consequence that historical scientists and their cohorts were mouthing utter gibberish.  Here is Kitcher’s articulation of this view, in a discussion of Priestley’s phlogiston chemistry: 
If we assume that his [Priestley’s] central terms do not refer, then he has to appear as serendipitous—producing a stream of babble while simultaneously doing things (isolating oxygen, synthesizing water) that somehow enable others to repeat his doings and discuss them. ([1993], p. 98)
The consequent does not follow from the antecedent.  As we have seen, there are theories in which information can be successfully communicated even in the face of reference failure.  The Fregean position that sentences with non-referring names express complete senses is one obvious possibility.  The position of Adams and Stecker, discussed in §2.2, provides a DRT position in which Kitcher’s conditional fails: on their view, ‘The air in this jar is full of phlogiston’ expresses a partial proposition and thus lacks a truth-value.  However, it nonetheless can be used to communicate descriptive information pragmatically, such as ‘The air in this jar impedes combustion and respiration’.  And that pragmatic communication is sufficient to conduct significant laboratory work.  
Perhaps other ways of lessening the supposed sting of semantic anti-realism can be found (see (Rowbottom [2011]) for a recent defense of semantic anti-realism).  In particular, the semantic anti-realism that figures in the present argument is not the ridiculed positivistic translations of theoretical claims into a language of pure sense data.  The type of semantic anti-realism at issue in the above argument is different: whereas a verificationist semantics holds that theoretical terms do not even aim or purport to refer, the semantic anti-realism that figures in the conclusion of my argument is compatible with the claim that theoretical terms aim to refer.  But often, as a matter of fact, such terms fail to refer.​[37]​ 
	Since I have bracketed the issue of whether the PI is a good argument, scientific realists might hope to embrace my argument here as a reductio of the PI—the absurd conclusion being semantic anti-realism.  However, there is a complication with regarding my argument as another arrow in the realist’s quiver.  A common realist response to the standard understanding of the PI is to admit that although parts of past theories are strictly speaking false, in many cases they are nonetheless approximately true.  An adequate theoretical account of approximate truth has proved notoriously elusive (Miller [1974]), but the phenomenon to be explicated is clear enough (for example, Kepler’s claim that the planetary orbits are elliptical is approximately true, though interplanetary gravitational forces render it literally false).  Many scientific realists respond to the standard understanding of the PI by conceding that chunks of the theories on Laudan’s list of discarded theories are strictly speaking false, but nonetheless approximately true—and holding that this approximate truth is good enough for most realists.  However, if the PI is instead an argument for semantic anti-realism, this realist response may not be available.  For whereas the notion of approximate truth makes intuitive sense (however difficult it has been to explicate), the notion of being approximately truth-valued but literally truth-valueless seems much less intuitive.  What would a sentence look like that is strictly speaking truth-valueless, yet somehow is ‘close’ to having a truth-value?  Now, it may be possible to develop such a notion; for example, if one models vagueness as inducing truth-value gaps, then perhaps if Fred is almost determinately bald, then ‘Fred is bald’ is strictly speaking truth-valueless but almost truth-valued.​[38]​  Nonetheless, the status of being approximately truth-valued but strictly truth-valueless is unintuitive and undeveloped at present, especially for the central case of reference failure, so the realist appeal to approximate truth in the case of the standard understanding of the PI is not available to a realist who wishes to accept the argument from the PI to semantic anti-realism.
Speaking very generally, philosophy has grown increasingly specialized in recent years.  This specialization has been beneficial in many ways; however, we should periodically check developments in other subfields, to ensure our various conclusions are consistent. I have attempted this type of check here: common views in the philosophy of language are in tension with the position that the PI provides evidence that current theories are false.
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^1	  For example: ‘while the history of science is a success story which is without parallel, it is in fact the history of good false theories which have been overthrown by better false theories’ (Sankey [1991], p. 423); also see among others (Stanford [2006], p. 7).
^2	  Kitcher ([1993]) and McLeish ([2005]) recognize that this is an apparent consequence of ‘phlogiston’, ‘caloric’, etc. failing to refer.
^3	  Thanks to P. D. Magnus for explicitly posing this question.
^4	  Semantic anti-realism about theoretical science is very different from the generalized semantic anti-realism of Dummett and his followers, since their semantic anti-realism applies to every declarative sentence, not just those of the higher reaches of theoretical science.
^5	  A highly abridged version of part of this argument can be found in (Frost-Arnold [2011]).
^6	  Hartry Field popularized another example of over-designation ([1973]).  ‘Mass’ can be defined in one of two ways in special relativity: relativistic mass (total energy/ c2) or proper (or rest) mass (non-kinetic energy/ c2).  There is no such thing as Newtonian mass; so when a Newtonian uses the word ‘mass’, it over-designates: it refers to both relativistic mass and proper mass.
^7	  A group is polyphyletic if the last common ancestor of the group members is not a member of that group.  For example, the term ‘warm-blooded’ (or, more precisely today, ‘endotherm’) is polyphyletic, for it is comprised of the birds and the mammals.  However, the last common ancestor of the birds and mammals was a reptile, which is not warm-blooded.  A group is paraphyletic if not all the descendents of the last common ancestor of the group members are contained in that group.  
^8	  There is controversy concerning whether species are kinds or individuals.  If species are the latter, then terms for species are names, not natural kind terms.
^9	  I am generalizing here: the no-proposition view, like the partial-proposition view discussed next, is standardly introduced in the context of empty names, and empty natural kind terms are not always discussed explicitly.
^10	  Of course, there are also the use/ inferential role theories of meaning.  I do not consider these here, not because of their intrinsic promise or problems, but because of the dialectical situation of this paper.  In the scientific realism debate, as usually framed, two fundamental questions are: ‘Are scientific theories (approximately) true?’ and ‘Do their theoretical terms refer?’  Truth and reference are central concepts in DRT and Fregeanism, so they hook up nicely with the realism debate as standardly formulated.  Use theories, on the other hand, attempt to displace truth and reference from pride of theoretical place, and as a result, if one adopts a use theory of meaning, then (for better or worse) the scientific realism debate, as standardly formulated, has trouble getting off the ground. 
^11	  Whether the restriction to atomic sentences is necessary depends on whether one adopts an analog of the weak or strong Kleene scheme for compound sentences containing truth-valueless components.  On the weak scheme, a compound sentence with any truth-valueless components is itself truth-valueless, whereas this is not the case on the strong scheme (e.g. a conjunction with one false component is always false, even if the other components are all truth-valueless).  So ‘atomic’ is necessary if one adopts the scheme, but not if one adopts the weak scheme.  Hereafter, I will include ‘atomic’, since that forestalls having to make a choice between the weak and strong schemes.  
^12	  ‘[T]he information conveyed by “Fa” when “a” is vacuous is the information of an open sentence “Fx”’ (Adams and Stecker [1994], p. 390).
^13	  McDowell challenges this view by pointing to passages in which Frege states that such sentences express ‘mock thoughts’ (McDowell [1982]); this interpretation would align Frege closer to the no- or partial-proposition camp.
^14	  I do argue, at the end of this subsection, that one cannot simultaneously accept both the PI and extant theories of how now-discarded theoretical terms can refer (e.g. the view that ‘ether’ refers to the electromagnetic field).   
^15	  For a roughly similar argument, see (Braun [forthcoming]).
^16	  This does not establish the strong claim that there are no uninstantiated properties.  It only concludes that no natural kind term can successfully refer to an uninstantiated natural kind.
^17	  I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
^18	  There is widespread agreement that mere ostention of samples will not suffice to fix the reference of theoretical terms (Psillos [1999], p. 289).  For we lack direct perceptual contact with the purported referent; contrast this with gold or tiger, which are not standardly considered theoretical terms.  Even Putnam says that we fix the reference of a theoretical term by specifying some manifest properties, and saying that term t refers to whatever causes these phenomena.  (Furthermore, it is generally recognized that this description must be fairly detailed, or reference failure will be impossible: if ‘phlogiston’ refers to whatever causes combustion and oxidation, then ‘phlogiston’ refers to oxygen—which is absurd.)
^19	  To clarify: this argument does not demonstrate that ‘Superseded theories are typically not approximately true’ and ‘Superseded theoretical terms typically refer’ are logically inconsistent.  Heterodox anti-realism is logically possible.  My point is only that, if one attempts to use currently available justifications to justify the claim that discarded terms (e.g. ‘lumeniferous ether’) refer, then certain assumptions needed for that justification are logically inconsistent with ‘Superseded theories are not approximately true’.  
^20	  Of course, the PI-proponent could accept that in a few particular cases, what she originally thought was a non-referring term turns out to refer.  She could be persuaded that certain past terms have a sufficiently good realizer of the corresponding Ramsified open sentence.  (Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.)  One can remain a PI-proponent while conceding that a few of one’s initially-proffered examples of non-designating terms do in fact designate (just as one can remain a realist while accepting that a few, perhaps unrepresentative past theoretical terms failed to designate).
^21	  We cannot maintain that every sentence containing a non-referring term is false: for if we did, and if A is a sentence with a non-referring name, then we would have to say that both A and not-A are false—so A would have to be both true and false.  Braun and others who share his view of course recognize this, and this is why they hold that all atomic sentences containing non-referring terms are false.
^22	  The other two kinds of free logics are neutral, in which all atomic sentences containing non-referring terms are truth-valueless, and positive, in which at least one atomic sentence containing a non-referring term is true (e.g. ‘Vulcan = Vulcan’).
^23	  Another type of reason could be a very general argument for bivalence.  However, two leading current defenders of bivalence, Williamson and Glanzberg, both defend the view that every complete proposition is either true or false, and explicitly deny that every sentence is either true or false.  These defenders even point to cases of designation failure and partially-defined predicates as examples of utterances that are neither true nor false (Williamson [1994], p. 196, p. 198; Glanzberg [2004], p. 188).  
^24	  On its standard first-order logic regimentation, ‘Vulcan exists’ is of course not an atomic sentence.  However, its component x =Vulcan is an atomic formula, and the same worry recurs there: does each value of the variable x make this formula false, or truth-valueless?  
^25	  A similar sentiment: ‘sentences such as “Vulcan does not exist” are not meaningless, but do not express complete thoughts or propositions or have truth-values. … Vacuous terms play an inferential role or a causal role in behavior in virtue of their syntax and the semantics of the other constituents of the sentence (or sentences with which the given sentence is associated)’ (Adams and Stecker [1994], p. 389).
^26	  Further arguments against negative free logic can be found in (Lambert [2002], p. 156).
^27	  That is, is the conjunction of a false sentence and a truth-valueless sentence false (strong Kleene scheme), or truth-valueless (weak Kleene scheme)?
^28	  For a recent suggestion to resuscitate descriptivism about natural kind terms, see (Wikforss [2005]).
^29	  Thanks to Jonathan Cohen for discussion.
^30	  For example, even Scott Soames, who endorses Salmon’s treatment of empty names for fictional characters, does not follow him this far ([2002], p. 96).
^31	  (Goldberg [2005]) advocates for a similar view.
^32	  Here is a final proposal, which I do not consider in the text, because I think it is untenable.  Conceivably, someone could agree that ‘phlogiston’ expresses no property, but nonetheless claim that it still has an extension, viz. the empty set.  And since truth-values are determined in part by the extensions of sentential constituents, ‘phlogiston’-containing atomic sentences could still be true-valued.  While this position is logically consistent, it would be very unusual to hold that a kind term designates no kind, and yet has an extension nonetheless—for extensions are standardly associated with semantic contents.  Thanks to David Braun for discussion of this issue.
^33	  For further discussion of how presupposition failure and vague or open-texture terms are responsible for truth-value gaps in the scientific record, see ([Frost-Arnold (2011), §3).
^34	  I place scare quotes around ‘disambiguation’, because Field (who pioneered this strategy) and others think that over-designation is not the same thing as ambiguity (Field [1973]).  I take no stand here on this issue. 
^35	  Some wish to keep truth simpliciter distinct from truth-on-all-disambiguations; this distinction is marked by calling the latter ‘supertruth’. 
^36	  Stanford and Kitcher ([2000]) endorse this view when, in a baptismal sample, there is more than one natural kind that is (i) instantiated by all the samples, (ii) lacking amongst the foils, and (iii) is satisfied by some reference-fixing description.
^37	  This is still a species of semantic anti-realism.  This is clear if one considers the epistemic analogue: someone who believes that the aim of science is truth (about the unobservable), but that mature sciences are not even approximately true, would still count as an (epistemic) anti-realist.
^38	  See (Williams [2011]) for a formal development of this idea.
